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Abstract
This research uses an experimental design to investigate how incentive structure influences goal
achievement among disadvantaged high school students in Medellin, Colombia. Of particular
interest is how treatment effects influence school performance as well as how this may vary with
differing key characteristics of the participants. Medellin, Colombia, like much of South America
suffers from high levels of inequality in the city proper. Improving educational outcomes in
impoverished neighborhoods is essential for the growth of these neighborhoods and the greater
community in which they are located. The model used in this experiment is inspired by the Family
Independence Initiative (FII). This research finds that conditional incentives in particular play a
significant role in determining the achievement of objectives and that those participants in the
conditional incentive treatment tend to perform better after the conclusion of the experiment.

1. Introduction
Medellin and Colombia have greatly improved overall welfare measures in recent decades.
While Medellin has made great strides in innovation and industry, Colombia’s second largest
city still suffers from high inequality. The percentage of the population who categorize
themselves among the poor has risen in recent years from 12% in 2011 to 19% in 2014 (Medellin
Como Vamos, 2014). A large portion of the population remain employed only in the informal
sector. The vast majority of the poor reside in smaller neighborhoods within several of the city’s
16 communes, many of which with significantly impoverished conditions.
A key determinant of future earnings potential is educational attainment. UNICEF
educational statistics estimate overall participation rates for secondary school age children in
Colombia to be in the mid-70th percentile. In Colombia, where children are required to complete
a 9th grade level, attendance is relatively high for most until the age of 13 when it begins to
decline. As children get older, the attendance rate falls from the mid 90’s to the lower 80’s for 17
year olds (Barrera-Osorio et al. 2011). This estimate is somewhat lower for males and children
from poorer communities. This trend is further exacerbated when looking at enrollment and
completion for schooling beyond 9th grade. According to information compiled from 2010
Demographic and Health Survey data, upper secondary school completion (10th and 11th grade)
is lower than 50% for the population aged 15 to 24 (FHI360, 2017).
The Family Independence Initiative was introduced originally in the United States as an
approach that combines goal setting, incentive schedules, and self-help groups to empower
families with the means to lift themselves out of poverty. It has shown remarkable results at the
community level and it has been replicated across numerous cities. The initiative is built on the
principle that individuals can escape poverty by changing their decision making and attitudes,
along with accumulating social capital through community interdependence (O’Brien &
Stuhldreher, 2011). Furthermore, the success of the model has led to research on its functioning
in a scientific matter through a field experiment in Medellin, Colombia (Aguinaga et. al., 2016).
The aforementioned 2013 experiment studies the effects of the FII model (self-alleviation
of poverty) in a developing atmosphere (Aguinaga et. al., 2016). The field experiment focused on
the business performance and social capital of small business owners that were involved with a
micro financial institution (MFI) in Medellin, Colombia. The study finds that the combination of
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goals, self-help groups, and an incentive backed reward system for goal achievement provide a
significant platform for increasing business performance. This research uses the 2013 study as a
template while delving specifically into how incentive effects can be revealed in 9th grade students
in schools in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Treatment participants select goals targeted at
improving educational performance and attendance in schools, both of which have particular
difficulty in maintaining high standards in these areas.
The design of the project consists of developing five different treatments among the
selected schools each emphasizing goal-setting, self-help groups, incentives, as well as a
combination of these (the FII model) and a pure control group. The schools were chosen based
on several criteria: located in Medellin within the greater state of Antioquia, Colombia, enrolling
an overwhelming majority of students in the lower three economic strata of seven, and having
similar classroom sizes and learning environments. The nature of the project is to implement,
among the different treatment groups, a number of sessions where students are required to select
a goal for themselves to adhere to or complete within the next two weeks.
The Millennium Development Goals contributed dramatically to the introduction of
research into new incentive structures as a way of increasing educational performance in still
developing nations. Direct cash transfers have become increasingly popular, especially in Latin
America, at reducing poverty through an income supplement while simultaneously seeking to
lower the opportunity cost of education for low income families. Oportunidades (now Prospera
and formerly Progresa) in Mexico and Familias en Accion in Colombia are two such programs.
The inherent trouble in measuring the effects of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) is that they
are intrinsically intertwined on the desired outcomes themselves. This makes capturing the effect
challenging if the conditions were not enforced.
In this research, with the cooperation of the Antioquia Secretary of Education and the
Medellin City Hall, we explore whether incentives add to the achievement level of a list of
education based goals and whether our incentive structure and subsequent objective achievement
can be associated with higher educational performance. The results indicate that conditional
incentive structures have the capability of increasing the likelihood of objective achievement by
over six times. Furthermore, achievement conditional incentive structures return significantly
positive effects on post-experiment grades relative to those program participants with no
conditional incentive component.
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2. Relevant Literature
Why Education?
The argument that future earnings potential relies on educational input as an acquired
skill (not merely as a signal) has been well researched with varying conclusions as to its actual
eminence. We can begin by referring to education as its more esoteric form: human capital. The
basis for researching the inclusion of incentives to bolster the decision for further educational
attainment stems from the theory of human capital accumulation and its subsequent connection
to economic development as a whole.
Lucas (1987) provides a comprehensive starting platform which covers human capital
theory as it stood in the late 20th century. Covered in Lucas’ review is the amalgamation of
breakthroughs by Shultz and Becker, Solow, Cobb and Douglas, Uzawa, and Romer. The
consolidated result is the hypothesis that workers will contribute to production with their own
labor dependent upon their own skill level. Furthermore, workers will invest in their own skill
level based upon the opportunity cost of this investment and the potential returns. In turn, higher
skilled workers will better add to the productive output of an economy overall, as well as increase
the returns to the physical capital in a society.
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) take this theory of external returns to human capital to the
empirical table with several theoretical positions. At this point, there is little articulation on
whether private (internal) or social (external) returns to human capital investment should be
larger. If the educational attainment of an individual representing their human capital is
implemented more as a means of job signaling, then social returns will be even lower than
expected. On the other hand, the lower costs of firm investment due to a higher concentration of
human capital in a geographic locale could lead to much higher social returns as well as private
returns. Rough estimates for private returns to educational investment may be as high as 10%.

Level of Educational Investment:
In “Human Capital Policy,” Carneiro and Heckman (2003) assert that individuals who
invest first in human capital face higher costs. One might think of this as an additional amount
of social benefits to human capital investment: the lower prices of future human capital
4

investment. While the empirical results testing the social returns to human capital investment
tend to be modest, they are most often found to be significantly positive. These higher initial
costs are reflective of the barriers to higher education often faced by those in developing
countries. These barriers take many forms including discounting returns to education, higher
envisioned opportunity costs of not working, and lack of access to collateral or credit for higher
education investment.
Investigating the low adoption of further human capital investment reveals inconsistent
discounting of the present value of future returns to additional schooling, again more likely
occurring with students in lower and middle income countries. Many randomized control trials
(RCTs) analyzing incentivizing students to increase their consumption of schooling focus on
researching how offsetting these costs through scholarships, unconditional transfers, or
conditional transfers is likely to increase enrollment. Angrist and Lavy (2002) draw such
conclusions from one empirical study on an experiment conducted in Israel on high school
matriculation. They also make connections between further barriers to educational investment;
many students often face liquidity constraints that may hamper their desired level of educational
investment.
Card and Lemieux (2001) also evaluate this theory. Students who are more financially
constrained, or are born when there are higher interest rates on borrowing for tuition, face higher
costs of schooling. These findings contribute to the perception that investment, and consequently
attainment of education, may be very undervalued and quite below a sub-optimal level for societal
growth in the long run.
On Incentives:
While increased human capital investment provides the objective half of the experiment,
incentivizing this desirable outcome is its counterpart. The question remains, do incentives
work? As in many instances of economic debate, the answer is it depends. Alfie Kohn (1993)
contributes several theoretical views as to why rewards, as a tool for motivating output
(particularly in the workplace), are prone to failure. He argues that while they often elicit
increases in objective completion, these results are likely transitory and will disappear as soon as
the reward is removed. This pathway to negative effects is what Benabou and Tirole, in “Intrinsic
and Extrinsic Motivation,” describe as dissonance theory. Dissonance theorists believe that
5

rewards act as a form of negative reinforcement, especially in the long run (2000). On the other
hand, empirical studies often find that, given the nature of the incentive and the conditions of the
environment, incentivizing behavior has the capability of eliciting lasting salience in subjects (see
next section).
The consensus on incentives is that they can show certain results, depending on what the
intended results may be. If the results are short-term accomplishments that make further
investment in socially and privately beneficial human capital more probable, then they make a
strong case for intervention and possible government policy support.
Intervention Methods and Incentive Structure:
Connecting the way in which incentives are believed to work in the realm of educational
outcomes has become slightly more complex than simply offering financial rewards contingent
on enrollment in recent years. Although conditional transfers often have the desired effect of
increased enrollment (PROGRESA, PANES), perhaps more precise avenues exist which lower
the costs associated with implementation by organizations and governments. A main connection
that arises in most of the recent literature is the argument that educational performance is a
strong indication of educational attainment in the present as well as the likelihood of the decision
to further invest in education in the future. Research on student preferences suggests that as
students become older, rewards outside of verbal praise for work well done becomes much more
desirable (Fefer et. al. 2016).
Attempting to achieve an overall complex outcome over a length of time may prove more
difficult for people in general. Rather, more specific tasks that contribute to acquiring the
capability to complete the long-term objective prove more effective (Seijts & Latham, 2001).
Concerning how best to approach incentive conditionalities for students, Roland Fryer (2010) in
“Financial Incentives and Student Achievement”, presents evidence that having rewards based
on student inputs such as number of books read, attendance, homework completion, and so on
bear higher success in improving outcomes than having rewards based on the outcomes
themselves. Fryer’s theory suggests that students are likely uncertain of their own production
function and would benefit from further small scale incentives to bolster their overall school
performance which may lead to greater returns in the long run.
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While certain social and environmental characteristics can have an impact on students’
ability to complete goals (Anderman & Anderman, 1999), past research also supports the idea
that increasing performance at a crucial point in the educational career of high school students
can still contribute to graduation rates despite preexisting characteristics (Neild et. al., 2008).
Therefore, creating a program design focused on having subjects setting smaller objectives
repeatedly at such a critical point in time may well contribute to a better educational outcome.
In “The Effect of Performance Based Incentives on Educational Achievement: Evidence
from a Randomized Experiment,” Levitt, List, and Sadoff propose significant theoretical
contributions in its experimental framework (2016). The authors assert that perhaps varying the
incentive structure as either fixed rate or lottery may result in one having a more pronounced
effect than the other. A second main variation on the model is that the recipient of the incentive
matters. The authors postulate that there is an interplay between the effort of both parents and
students in achieving certain educational outcomes, and that the merit that each will receive and
how transfers are allocated within a family may contribute to the effect the financial incentives
have on educational performance. Evidence would suggest that neither of these variations
provide differing results within their experiment. This result along with the additional costs
associated with this model specification influenced the decision to exclude these factors from the
treatment design.
Exploration in the joining of incentives and educational attainment further expands again
from Levitt, List, Sadoff, as well from Neckermann. Their results indicate that non-monetary
rewards are not as effective as monetary rewards for older students but that in younger cohorts,
non-monetary rewards are similarly significant and much cheaper from an implementation
perspective. Furthermore, their finding that if rewards are delayed upon completion of the
objective, the significance of the incentive on outcomes becomes insignificant. They imply that
this result follows the theory that inconsistent and large discounting occurs for students and
adolescents in general.
In the Family Independence Initiative, incentives were structured so that families are
rewarded for completing any of roughly 50 different financial, social, and education based goals.
A key component of this method was that families were able to choose which goals to set for
themselves, eliminating a more stringent, restricting pathway to accomplishment (O’Brien &
Stuhldreher, 2011). The average increase in income across all demographics was 27% in the
7

Oakland, California implementation of the FII. The incentive methodology of the FII
compliments the findings of Fryer, and it utilizes incentives on inputs as a means to elicit better
performance in students, a keystone of the experimental design for which this paper discusses.

3. Experimental Design & Subject Pool:
3.1 Overview
The experiment took place in Medellin, Colombia in the Antioquia province. Seven
schools were selected based on similar demographic characteristics, particularly on the economic
strata of the enrolled students. Majority of students in all schools fall within strata one and two.
Strata range is from zero to six, the higher numbers indicating better economic conditions (Office
of the Secretary of Education, Antioquia).
Ninth Grade students were chosen as participants for the study due to the structure of
the Colombian education system. Ninth grade (14-17 year olds) is the final year of schooling for
the lower secondary level and marks a significant chapter in future education investment. It is
also the level for which both attendance rates decrease and matriculation begins to dwindle.
Participants would meet with the program implementation team once every two weeks
consisting of a baseline survey, five goal setting and follow up survey sessions, and finally several
post experiment survey sessions for a total of eight sessions over a two and a half month period.

3.2 Schools
Of the seven schools that were selected, five schools had a single class of ninth graders,
one school had two classrooms and the final school had three classrooms of ninth graders. The
relatively small amount of ninth grade students per school allowed the inclusion of all eligible
children and contributed to the school selection process. A map displaying the location and
commune of the institutions within Medellin is available in the Appendix.
Randomization of treatment assignment is done at the classroom level. Classroom level
randomization was chosen due to probable spillover between treatments if implemented at the
individual level, logistical constraints, and impartiality concerns to the students. In addition,
increasing the educational performance of students through incentive introduction proves more
effectual when applied to larger, consistent groups (Angrist and Lavy, 2002). Fortuitously,
students remained with their respective class cohort throughout their day schedule, minimizing
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interaction between the groups in the schools with other classes assigned to a different treatment
or control arm. The only remaining stipulation on treatment randomization is not allowing both
a Prize and No Prize treatment classroom within the same school. This is purely to maintain fair
treatment across all program participants. A chart displaying classrooms’ (within each school)
assignment to treatment is included in the Appendix.

3.3 Treatments
The experimental design is focused on isolating different treatment effects on objective
achievement and post implementation educational performance of the participant groups. Figure
1 describes the different treatment assignments. The column and row headings reflect the
components of the aforementioned Family Independence Initiative study.
SHG, or Self-Help Group, refers to the students required to engage in a group style
interaction about their selected goals with their peers. More specifically, students share their
previous session goal selection and the difficulty or ease with which it was or was not completed.
The completion or incompletion of the student’s objective was then made known to the entire
classroom. This interaction serves as a form of positively framed peer pressure as well as a
channel of shared accomplishment.
The Prize row indicates that the receipt of a non-transferrable incentive was awarded
conditional on objective completion. The No Prize row participants are given transfer regardless.
These two contingencies form a divide between a fully conditional transfer and an unconditional,
yet framed transfer. This unconditional transfer differs from being truly unconditional in that it
is offered within a school environment in an education based study. The nature of the incentive,
forthcoming, also plays into the framing of the unconditional incentive.
The four separate treatment groups within the lower right of the design matrix are all
goal-setting treatment groups. Participants that fall into the cell with both Prize and SHG
(Treatment V) are the corollary of the FII treatment. The top left cell in the matrix without Prize
or SHG creates a form of control group for with which to compare the separate FII inspired
components present in the other arms. In addition to these four groups, another control arm was
also formed where participants do not set goals, yet receive the transfer nevertheless. All
partitions of the experiment, including the control, were given a survey each session with
questions as to whether they had completed activities equivalent to the list of goals from which
the treatment groups would select.
9

3.4 Goals
All the possible goals were designed with assistance of the teachers and administrators of
the selected schools to be comparable to one another in terms of difficulty while simultaneously
aiming to improve problematic performance arenas. A complete list of these objectives can be
found in the appendix. Subjects in the four goal-setting arms of the experiment would select a
task to be attempted in the two weeks between sessions. Some goals involving a specific, essay
related task were only available once, other more general objectives were available for selection
repeatedly. One trademark limitation of the goal design was ensuring that the completion of each
of the objectives was easily monitored. This is especially valid for the Prize Treatment
participants, as they would only receive the incentive upon goal completion.

3.5 The Incentive
The incentive or transfer for this research required a design of its own. In order to ensure
that students that received a form of payment were the ones who would benefit, the payment
needed to be non-transferrable. This stipulation, as well as other ethical concerns eliminated cash
as an option for the program. School administrators suggested a voucher payment that could be
redeemed at a school store which provided food and beverages for the students. Every school had
one of these tiendas and the vouchers themselves were able to be printed with the recipient’s
name and Institution on it. Store operators were notified of the number of vouchers that each
student received each session so that copies would be refuted.
Each voucher was good for 2,000 COP and 6 of these vouchers were given to students in
all of the experiment partitions every session totaling 12,000 COP. For this amount students
could obtain several empanadas, bags of chips and sodas. It is roughly equivalent to what $10
USD could buy at a snack store in a United States high school. The enthusiasm at each of the
school’s when this incentive was announced was clearly palpable. Participants in the treatments
conditional on goal completion would receive zero vouchers if their selected objective was not
completed. All participants were awarded 4,000 COP for completing the baseline survey. This
also served as a means of instilling trust of the payment of promised future transfers and the
validity of the vouchers themselves.

3.6 Subject Pool
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Total participants with available data are 363. Mean and standard deviation statistics on
key characteristics for subjects in the experiment and by treatment group are available in the
Appendix. The random assignment at classroom level resulted in a slightly larger control group
than any of the treatment arms. Subjects across all treatments were around the age of 15 with
only the control group being slightly younger than 15 on average. All treatment arms contained
between 40% to 50% female enrollment. All groups reported that, on average, their households
were slightly female dominated and had just over 2 school age children per household. Those
who only set goals for the experiment with no additional conditions were more likely to report
having missed meals in a week. The grading scale in Colombia is from 1 to 5. Lowest Reported
Grade and Base Esteem, both on a scale of 1 to 5 were comparable between groups. Lowest
Reported Grade represents their worst received grade in the participant’s currently enrolled
subjects. The Base Esteem represents the average of a combination of 5 different self-esteem
oriented questions delivered on the baseline surveys. In summary, the different treatment groups
and control are largely indistinguishable on most observable characteristics, as a whole.

4. Model and Hypothesis:
In developing the experiment, the goal was to allow separate analysis of how assignment
to different treatment groups that utilize group interaction, conditional incentives, or both may
benefit or deter goal achievement and bolster educational output. This research is aimed
specifically at evaluating the effect of the conditional incentive aspect and how it pertains to goal
achievement and subsequently educational performance.
Model 1:
Achievementit = α + β2Incentivei + β1SHGi + β3SHG*Incentive + β4Gradesiq + β5MealsMissedi + γ𝑿i + ԑi

Where the left hand side variable Achievement represents whether an individual achieved their
objective in session t. SHG, Incentive, and SHG*Incentive refer to whether an individual is
assigned to the group interaction, receive an incentive only upon completion of their selected
objective, or a combination of both of these, respectively. Grades represents an individual’s grade
average prior to the program implementation (quarters one and two) that is used as a measure of
the level of school performance. Meals Missed is a representation of how many meals (less than
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3 per day) an individual reported to have missed in a week due to finances. While all participants
are in the lower economic strata, this measure provides a more varying, current estimation of
how dire their state actually may be. X is a vector of individual covariates that are likely to have
some significant contribution to goal achievement. Included are the difficulty of the selected
objective (as reported by the students themselves at baseline) Age, Gender, and Self-Esteem
estimates. In this model treatment recipients are compared to the control group comprised of
individuals who set goals but do not receive additional treatment specification.
Hypothesis 1:
The expectation is that incentives will have a positive effect on an individual’s estimated
probability of goal achievement. Furthermore, the FII treatment is expected to be the most
effective of the treatments in increasing the likelihood of goal achievement. A significant β3 on the
interaction term would indicate that those individuals with both group interactions and conditional
incentives fare better at achieving set objectives compared to those with only one or the other. The better

performing students pre-implementation are expected to be more likely to achieve their
objectives while those which suffer from worse economic conditions will be less likely to be able
to reach achievement status for their selected objectives. Subsequent analysis is also conducted
on how these variables contribute to post experiment grades or educational output
Model 2:
PostGradesiq = α + β2Incentivei + β1SHGi + β3SHG*Incentive + β4Gradesiq + β5MealsMissedi + γ𝑿i + ԑi

Similar analysis of variables from Model 1, now using post experiment quarter grade
data as the dependent variable. In Model 2, treatment individuals are not only compared to
those who set objectives but to the pure control group which received the school vouchers
without setting goals.
Hypothesis 2:
Conditional incentives will prove to have a positive effect on post program grade
average. The overall effect for the group and conditional incentive interaction will be positive
as well.
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5. Results
5.1 Model 1 Estimation
A logit estimation with robust standard errors is chosen to analyze the relationships
between the different components of the treatment design and the probability of having achieved
the selected goal. Table 2 displays the output. Both Incentives and Self-Help Groups add
significant probability to goal completion in all specifications relative to the group who selected
goals alone. Conditional incentives in the full model specification (5) return a coefficient of 1.827,
significant at the 1% level. If we imagine all other variables non-changing, the resulting odds
ratio can be translated as being over six times more likely at having achieved the selected
objective if assigned into a treatment arm with the conditional incentive component.
While these effects follow the expectations of the experiment, the Self-Help Group and
Incentive components offer no additional marginal effect when combined with one another within
the implementation of this experiment. In fact, in the most basic specification of the model with
no other variables of interest or controls other than the treatment components, the interaction
coefficient indicates a poorer performance than SHG or Incentive components alone. This
coefficient becomes insignificant in more inclusive specifications.
When comparing the experimental components in terms of the treatment groups for
which they comprise, estimation output becomes more difficult to analyze. A much cleaner
visualization of the relationship between the treatment arms and average goal achievement is
provided by Figure 3 in the Appendix. This graph tells the same story as the estimation output
from Table 2, but from a new vantage point. The treatments with conditional incentives and
conditional incentive plus SHG clearly have the highest average achievement at above 70%. The
largely overlapping standard error bars on these two measures confirm the insignificant
additional effect of the interaction term in the Table 2 estimation. Comparatively, the average
achievement for those in the purely goal-setting group is right around 30%.
Of additional interest is how the covariates attached to the Table 2 logit estimation
correlate with goal achievement. Age is found to be a consistently insignificant factor for
objective achievement. This may be a sign that the incentive structure, or the experiment as a
whole could be implemented for different educational age groupings and still prove effective at
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eliciting a response. It is one avenue in which further research is required. Additionally, females
exhibit a greater proclivity for objective achievement on average in all specifications across all
treatments.
Two independent variables of particular interest in these specifications are Grade and
Meals Missed. During the baseline survey, students were asked several questions about their
household; among them how many meals, if any, they missed in a given week due to financial
reasons and whether they felt they were very poor, poor, getting by okay, or rich. The majority
of students reported that they were getting by okay despite likelihood of the opposite. As stated
previously, the participant schools’ strong majority of students come from the lowest economic
strata partitions. The reported number of missed meals may provide a more immediate evaluation
of their economic hardship. Notably, students that reported to have missed more meals had lower
probability of achieving their objective. The marginal effect at the mean of the attached
coefficients implies a roughly 3% decrease in goal achievement at the mean due to missing a meal,
with many students reporting up to seven missed meals in a given week.
In this research, we use Grade as a representation of overall school performance. This
value is calculated for each student as the average of each quarter grade. The quarter grades are
also an average calculated from the scores each student earned in ten separate courses in a given
quarter. These courses are part of the curriculum at all participating schools and thus offer
comparability and consistency across schools. In the Table 2 estimates, we find a positive
coefficient on Grade. Analyzing the marginal effects of these logit estimates, we find a roughly
20 percentage point increased likelihood of objective completion at the mean when grade
reported is one unit higher. The inclusion of this measure not only permits exploration of the
link between achievement and existing level of performance, but is an important control to better
estimate the treatment components. To add perspective, the grading scale is from zero to five
and the average grade across all participants (Table 1) is 3.46. Specification 5 was retested
individually for each treatment group and the significance and direction are maintained in the
coefficient for every single iteration. This result is further explored in Figure 4 in the Appendix.
It is noteworthy that in Table 2 specification (5) both the calculated Average Base Esteem
and Difficulty of Selection are insignificant determinants of goal achievement. A test to see if
these variables still added to the model significance was performed with a negative result. The
insignificance of the Difficulty of Selection is of utmost importance as the possible goals were
14

drawn out to be comparable in difficulty. With moderate variation in goal selection, this can be
inferred as resulting objective achievement is not due to students simply selecting easier tasks.
After the first meeting for each school, one goal was removed from the list for future selection as
it was deemed much too easy relative to the rest.
Figure 4 is a modified, more specific version of Figure 3. The graph continues to display
average achievement levels by treatment group, but adds a performance dimension as well.
Treatment groups are broken into two categories: passing average or failing average. A student
falls into the passing category if the average of all their quarter grades for the school year equals
or exceeds a 3.0, and failing otherwise. The goals and SHG arm, while inclusive of students failing
specific subjects, had no participants with less than a 3.0 average overall. This graph contributes
to the significant findings in that we still see a significantly different and positive effect of the
conditional incentives not only on well-performing students, but those who appear to be
struggling as well.
5.2 Estimation of Model 2.
Data pertaining to the performance of individuals after the experiment commenced was
provided courtesy of the Office of the Secretary of Education of Antioquia and was utilized in the
following manner.
Creation of a new panel type dataset was implemented by combining the personal
characteristics survey from the experiment itself and the quarterly grades of individual students.
As the experiment was implemented at the beginning of the third quarter, the periods for
evaluation are only the third and final quarters. An OLS estimation was conducted on model 2
with the quarter grades as the dependent variable and the conditional incentive, SHG, and
interaction of these two as the main variables of interest. The model contains the same control
variables as the logit estimation from model 1 with the addition of student’s average grade before
the project implementation. This accounts for students that were already performing well before
the project. The output is displayed in Table 3 in the Appendix. Resulting errors are robust to
heteroscedasticity.
The presence of the conditional incentive proves significant and positive throughout the
various specifications in Table 3 on student grades. The fully specified model coefficient of .033
is significant at the 10%. This coefficient is interpreted as a roughly 1% increase to grades
15

(considering an average of 3.46 across all subjects). While this effect estimate cannot be readily
described as huge, its potential as an educational tool for further incentive design flaunts
abundant potential.
An auxiliary regression was estimated with average achievement in place of the
experimental components SHG and Incentive. The result was positive and significant in all
instances with a coefficient of around .1. The interpretation is that an increase in average
achievement rate by .1 can be associated with a .01 increase in grade average

In further

investigating how school performance may be tied to goal achievement, a non-parametric
estimation is conducted. The idea that students are not just divided between those who do well
and those who do not, but more realistically lie on a spectrum of performance measures is obvious.
These various levels of performance may lead to inconsistencies in the relationship between
school performance and goal achievement, and indicates that a logistical or OLS estimation may
not reveal underlying relationships.
A Cleveland, or running line least squares estimation indicate a somewhat linear
relationship between average achievement and grades even when partitioned into different
treatment groups. Looking toward Figure 5, we see that each treatment group shows a slightly
positive and relatively steady relationship between third and fourth quarter grades and average
achievement rates.. The plausible exception is the goals only treatment section that shows a lull
in this positive relationship in the middle range of achievement. These localized results indicate
that at exemplary levels of achievement, students tend to have an average grade of around 4.0
compared to males. Through the more modest achievement rates this relationship shows little
change. If goal achievement has a similar relationship with grades, regardless of treatment
group, then the obvious choice for treatment should be the one that produces the highest
achievement average at the lowest cost.
5.3 Comparing Treatment and Control
In order to argue that it is in fact the combination of goal selection as well as the
treatments that contribute to students’ achievement, comparisons must be made between those
assigned to control versus treatment.

A student engaging in selection and attempting

completion of an objective cannot be directly compared to a “non-selecting” peer selecting and
achieving an objective. So, this analysis required a different approach with respect to the control
group. The investigation required all students, every two weeks, to answer whether or not they
16

had completed tasks equivalent to each one of the objectives regardless of whether they were in
treatment or control classrooms.
Combining these survey results with the data describing which goals were selected from
by individuals in treatment groups the treated become comparable with the control. A series of
logit specifications were run estimating whether individuals answered yes or no to each of these
activity questions that correspond to the goals. Table 3 displays these results. The second goal
in the experiment had two survey questions that pertained to its completion and so has two was
combined into an interaction that would only turn on if both questions were answered in the
affirmative. The row labeled “Selected Dependent Variable as Goal” is a binary that is one if an
individual selected whatever goal’s completion is being estimated in that specific column. We
would expect them all to be positive and significant.
Only Selection of Goal 3 lacks positivity in the probability estimation of answering yes to having
completed Goal 3. An encompassing translation of these results are that, save for Goal 3 (listed
in the appendix), a student in one of the goal selection groups has a higher likelihood of
completing a specific goal when selecting it, relative to the control group. . Participants in the
control group were still compensated for their participation and, being the only ones not actually
checked for completion of objectives, may be more likely to confirm having accomplished an
academically positive task. If this is the case, the confirming results of this table may even be
somewhat under representative.

6. Conclusion
The framework of the Family Independence Initiative focused on harnessing the power
of communities and its members’ innate ability to allow people to lift themselves out of poverty.
Inspired by the research of Aguinaga et. al.’s work with analyzing the component effects of the
FII among entrepreneurs, this research focused on exploring how the FII’s unique approach to
poverty alleviation could fare in an education centric design. Explicit focus of this contribution
is to analyze how incentive structures play into the achievement of educational objectives and
what implications these structures have on overall educational performance. Here are the main
conclusions:
1) Students respond to conditional incentives. The experiment effectively
consisted of a purely unconditional transfer, an educationally framed transfer, and
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a fully conditional incentive. The conditional form of the incentive fared the best
in terms of eliciting objective achievement.
2) Incentives are effective for many students. While top performing students
tend to have the higher goal achievement rates on average, the above results
remain robust across student grades. This is a promising result in that it implies
that incentives can elicit positive responses from many different kinds of students.
3) Incentives and achievement of educational input objectives can improve
student performance. Participants receiving the conditional incentive component
of the experiment saw a significant, albeit slight, improvement on grades. This
significant result shows promise for future incentive and objective setting research
with regards to improving educational performance.
Research is to be conducted on the effects of the program’s implementation on school
attendance in the near future. The findings of the analysis in this paper highlight probable
conduits for increasing educational performance in a developing atmosphere.
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Appendix of Tables and Figures:

Figure 1: Schools. Location of the seven schools participating in the experiment within the
communes of Medellin. Source of original map: Wikipedia. Used with licensed permission

Figure2: Experimental Design Matrix
Control Groups:
No Goals, No SHG, No Prizes
*Control Group (n=78)
N=313

Self-Help Groups SHG
(Social Capital)

No Prizes
Individual
Incentives
Prizes

No SHG

SHG

Treatment Group II
Goals, No SHG, No Prizes
(n=59)
Treatment Group IV
Goals, No SHG, Prizes
(n=55)

Treatment Group III
Goals, SHG, No Prizes
(n=63)
Treatment Group V
Goals, SHG, Prizes
(n=58)
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Figure 3: Average Achievement by Treatment Arm. Average of individual average achievement of
selected objective by Treatment Group. Standard error bars are displayed.
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Figure 4: Average Achievement by Treatment & Performance. Average of individual average
achievement of selected objective by Treatment Group and school performance. Passing GPA
refers to those students with a 3.0 or higher out of 5.0 year average. Failing is below 3.0. Standard
error bars are displayed. Goals, SHG treatment, had zero students with below a 3.0 AVERAGE
grade, but did have several students with below a 3.0 in specific subjects.

23

Figure 5: Non-Parametric Estimation of Grades. Independent variable is average achievement of the individual..
Graphical representation is broken down into 4 different treatment groups.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Individuals Overall and by Treatment Group
All
Control
Goals
SHG
Prize
Prize, SHG
Age
15.18
14.96
15.29
15.15
15.17
15.41
(1.158)
(1.140)
(1.364)
(0.963)
(1.077)
(1.206)
Student Gender
0.49
0.50
0.50
0.55
0.47
0.42
(0.501)
(0.503)
(0.504)
(0.502)
(0.504)
(0.498)
HH Size
4.86
4.81
5.00
4.53
4.97
5.50
(1.904)
(1.790)
(2.098)
(1.793)
(1.946)
(2.121)
Percent Female
0.55
0.56
0.53
0.57
0.51
0.52
(0.208)
(0.197)
(0.179)
(0.234)
(0.220)
(0.202)
HH Children
2.13
2.11
2.19
2.02
2.06
2.56
(1.136)
(1.138)
(1.283)
(0.969)
(1.099)
(1.338)
Meals Missed
0.69
0.64
1.05
0.90
0.59
0.27
(1.770)
(1.798)
(2.110)
(2.006)
(1.743)
(0.781)
Base Esteem
3.12
3.05
3.14
3.08
3.14
3.26
(0.462)
(0.442)
(0.490)
(0.407)
(0.421)
(0.533)
Lowest Grade
2.64
2.69
2.68
2.70
2.61
2.48
(0.826)
(0.625)
(0.786)
(0.913)
(0.850)
(1.012)
Avg. Grade
3.46
3.63
2.99
3.79
3.45
3.42
(0.661)
(0.376)
(1.087)
(0.346)
(0.351)
(0.403)
N
363
80
79
74
66
64
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 2: Logit Estimation of Achievement on Treatments and Covariates
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
VARIABLES
Achieved
Achieved
Achieved
Achieved
Achieved
Incentive
SHG
SHG & Incentive

1.720***
(0.186)
0.777***
(0.174)
-0.544**
(0.266)

1.866***
(0.212)
0.539***
(0.193)
-0.384
(0.286)
1.053***
(0.201)
-0.160***
(0.0416)

1.890***
(0.215)
0.536***
(0.197)
-0.361
(0.290)
1.001***
(0.226)
-0.154***
(0.0416)
0.0107
(0.0713)
0.526***
(0.148)

1.835***
(0.228)
0.492**
(0.205)
-0.296
(0.305)
1.021***
(0.245)
-0.138***
(0.0420)
-0.00484
(0.0755)
0.520***
(0.163)
0.256
(0.179)
-0.0195
(0.0447)

-0.742***
(0.129)

-4.359***
(0.770)

-4.618***
(1.625)

-5.129***
(1.824)

1.827***
(0.228)
0.465**
(0.207)
-0.271
(0.310)
1.032***
(0.249)
-0.132***
(0.0426)
0.0125
(0.0765)
0.499***
(0.163)
0.225
(0.181)
-0.0255
(0.0451)
-0.0943
(0.117)
-5.153***
(1.874)

1,102

1,002

987

900

885

Grade
Meals Missed
Age
Gender
Base Esteem
Base Risk
Goal Difficulty
Constant

Observations

Logit Estimation, Panel Data.
F (Wald- test) reveals Base Esteem, Base Risk and Goal Difficulty add no Significance to the Specification 5

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: OLS Estimation of 3rd and 4th Quarter Grades (Post-Implementation)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
VARIABLES
Grades
Grades
Grades
Grades
Incentive
SHG
SHG & Incentive

0.0583***
(0.0145)
0.00431
(0.0144)
-0.0161
(0.0199)

0.0332**
(0.0151)
-0.0249**
(0.0120)
0.00103
(0.0188)
0.00246
(0.00258)

0.0337**
(0.0151)
-0.0196
(0.0125)
0.00116
(0.0191)
0.00255
(0.00258)
-0.0154***
(0.00535)
0.0289***
(0.0104)

0.0279*
(0.0158)
-0.0265**
(0.0129)
0.00699
(0.0200)
0.00220
(0.00266)
-0.0192***
(0.00551)
0.0230**
(0.0106)
-0.00850
(0.0108)
0.00189
(0.00343)

1.008***
(0.0103)
-0.0907**
(0.0403)

1.005***
(0.0192)
-0.0434
(0.0761)

0.984***
(0.0198)
0.246**
(0.121)

0.988***
(0.0213)
0.313**
(0.130)

0.0334**
(0.0161)
-0.0230*
(0.0133)
0.00531
(0.0201)
0.00207
(0.00264)
-0.0190***
(0.00552)
0.0233**
(0.0107)
-0.0120
(0.0110)
0.00187
(0.00346)
-0.0335**
(0.0161)
0.989***
(0.0215)
0.357***
(0.132)

2,904
0.918

2,408
0.743

2,368
0.743

2,192
0.743

2,177
0.744

Meals Missed
Age
Gender
Base Esteem
Base Risk
Goal Difficulty
1st Quarter Grades
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(5)
Grades

OLS Estimation, Panel Type Data.

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

27

Table 4: Logit Estimation of Follow-Up Survey Pertaining to Goal Completion, All Individuals
VARIABLES
Dep. Var. as Goal
Age
Gender
Meals Missed
Grade
Constant

Observations

(1)
Goal 1

(2)
Goal 2

(3)
Goal 3

(4)
Goal 4

(5)
Goal 5

(6)
Goal 6

(7)
Goal 7

1.372***
(0.230)
-0.0102
(0.0410)
-0.158*
(0.0878)
-0.0182
(0.0245)
0.523***
(0.101)
-2.156***
(0.826)

-0.865***
(0.321)
0.348***
(0.0784)
0.189
(0.187)
0.00685
(0.0515)
-0.141
(0.189)
-7.703***
(1.610)

1.035***
(0.299)
-0.0751*
(0.0400)
-0.162*
(0.0870)
0.00742
(0.0239)
0.787***
(0.0992)
-1.312
(0.804)

2.215***
(0.237)
0.0464
(0.0468)
-0.129
(0.101)
0.0380
(0.0267)
0.159
(0.112)
-2.512***
(0.938)

1.410***
(0.247)
0.137***
(0.0399)
-0.323***
(0.0859)
-0.00671
(0.0237)
0.521***
(0.0967)
-4.010***
(0.802)

1.991***
(0.227)
-0.0388
(0.0483)
-0.280***
(0.104)
0.0418
(0.0270)
0.0836
(0.114)
-0.959
(0.960)

2.635***
(0.300)
0.0228
(0.0522)
-0.313***
(0.113)
-0.00885
(0.0316)
0.253**
(0.127)
-2.718***
(1.052)

2,368

2,368

2,368

2,368

2,368

2,368

2,368

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: List of Goals. Objective list from which students would select to attempt for a two week interval.
Numbers 4, 6, and 7 were non-repeatable. Goal 8 was removed from the list after the first session due to the
likelihood it was too easily accomplished.
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